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PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON
THE USE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
HOWARD S. LEVIE*
In 1980, a Diplomatic Conference convened by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in Geneva was successful in draft-
ing a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Ex-
cessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects1 ("Conven-
tional Weapons Convention"). Three Protocols, each relating to a
specific weapon or group of weapons, were attached. The Conven-
tional Weapons Convention was opened for signature at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York on April 10, 1981.2
The United States did not sign it until April 8, 1982, and since
then has ratified only the Convention and two of the Protocols. 3
The Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols received
the necessary twenty ratifications and accessions by June 2,
1983,4 and entered into force six months later on December 2,
1983.5
The purposes of this Article are (1) to determine why these
instruments were considered necessary; (2) to analyze the provi-
* A.B., Cornell University, 1928; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1930; LL.M., George
Washington University Law School, 1957; Colonel, JAGC, USA (Ret); Professor Emer-
itus of Law, Saint Louis University Law School; Charles H. Stockton Chair of Interna-
tional Law, U.S. Naval War College, 1971-1972; Adjunct Professor of International
Law, U.S. Naval War College, 1991-present. The opinions expressed herein are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions of any of the institu-
tions or organizations mentioned above.
1 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, app. A, 19 I.L.M. 1523,
1524 [hereinafter "1980 Final Acti], reprinted in TH LAWS OF ARAMD CONFLICTS 179
(Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Schindler & Toman].
2 See 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, art. 3, 19 I.L.M. at 1525, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 180.
3 See Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 192; S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess., 141 CONG. REc. 4568 (1995).
4 Ratification is "[t]he aftfiance... of a prior act which did not bind... whereby
the act, as to some or all persons, is given effect as if originally authorized. .. ."
BLAcies LAW DICTIONARY 1261 (6th ed. 1990). Accession is "Itihe absolute or condi-
tional acceptance by one or several nations of a treaty already concluded between
other sovereignties ... so that such nation becomes a party to it..." Id. at 14.
5 See Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 179.
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sions of the Convention and of the three Protocols; and (3) to as-
certain in what manner ratification will be in the best interests of
the United States.6
INTRODUCTION
As long ago as 1868, the Preamble of the Declaration of St.
Petersburg set forth a number of "limits at which the necessities
of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity."7 These
limits included the following:
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviat-
ing as much as possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate objects which States should endeavour
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the
enemy;
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possi-
ble number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their deaths inevitable; [and]
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary
to the laws of humanity.'
Articles 22 and 23(e) of the Regulations Attached to the 1899
Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of
War on Land,' and the same articles of the Regulations Attached
6 Items (2) and (3) will be discussed together.
7 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under
400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, St. Petersburg, reprinted in 1 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 95 (1907), and in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 102.
8 Id.
9 32 Stat. 1803, 1817 (1903), T.S. No. 403, reprinted in 1 TREATmS AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL ACTs OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 247 (C. Bev-
ans, ed., 13 vols., 1968-1976) [hereinafter Bevans], and in Schindler & Toman, supra
note 1, at 63.
Secretary of State Warren Christopher has described the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 as
significant treaties attempt[ing] to reduce the suffering caused by armed
conflicts and to provide protection to the victims of war, including the civil-
ian population and members of the armed forces who have been wounded or
captured. They are an attempt to reduce the inevitable suffering and dam-
age present during any war in a manner consistent with legitimate military
requirements.
88 AM. J. INr'L L. 748, 749 (1994). The first Conference in 1899 reduced a number of
existing customs on the rules and laws of war to written form. Basically, the second
Conference in 1907 made few changes in the 1899 Regulations. Today, these rules are
collectively known as the Law of The Hague.
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to the 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Laws and Cus-
toms of War on Land,10 include the following humanitarian rules:
Article 22: The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited.'"
Article 23 (e): In addition to the prohibitions provided by special
Conventions, it is especially prohibited12 [or forbidden]: To em-
ploy arms, projectiles, or material of a nature [calculated] to
cause unnecessary suffering.
1
Unfortunately, despite the vast increase in the nature and lethal-
ity of weapons which occurred during the course of the subsequent
seven decades, the only international agreement prohibiting or re-
stricting specific conventional weapons which became effective
during that period was the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, 14 prohibit-
ing the use of asphyxiating gases and bacteriological weapons.' 5
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference that took place in Geneva
between 1974 and 1977,16 the work of which culminated in two
additions to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions 17 (only one of
10 36 Stat. 2277, 2301-02 (1911), T.S. No. 539; 2 AM. J. IiN'L L. SuPP. 190 (1908);
reprinted in 1 Bevans, supra note 9, at 631, and in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1,
at 63.
n Id.
12 See Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 82.
13 To the same effect, see 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, June 8, 1977, art. 35(1)-(2) [hereinafter 1977 Additional
Protocol I], in 1 Swiss Federal Political Department, Official Records of the Diplo-
matic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanita-
rian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva, 1974-1977, Part 1, at 115 (1978)
[hereinafter Official Records], 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391, reprinted in Schindler
& Toman, supra note 1, at 621.
14 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Geneva, June 17, 1925, 26
U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 115; see
also 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stock-
piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26
U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 164, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 137
(using these weapons was not prohibited or restricted by 1972 Convention-this was
accomplished by the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol).
15 Contrary to the beliefs of some, neither the four 1949 Geneva Conventions for
the Protection of the Victims of War, see infra note 17, nor the 1977 Additional Proto-
col I has provisions containing prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific con-
ventional weapons.
16 The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts [hereinafter Diplomatic Con-
ference] met from 1974 to 1977.
17 There are four 1949 Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug.
1994]
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which will concern this Article'8 ), the International Committee of
the Red Cross ("ICRC") had sponsored a number of preliminary
conferences, the last of which was a Conference of Government
Experts that met in 1972. Although those conferences were con-
cerned with the reaffirmation and development of international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, and not with
prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific conventional
weapons, at the conclusion of the 1972 conference a group of the
government experts suggested that the ICRC should arrange a
special meeting to consult with legal, military, and medical ex-
perts on the question of express prohibitions or limitations of the
use of such conventional weapons as may cause unnecessary suf-
fering or be indiscriminate in their effect. 9
Complying with this suggestion, the ICRC convened meetings
of a selected group of experts in March and June 1973. These
meetings of experts did not attempt to formulate concrete propos-
als, but sought merely to document the weapons which required
consideration .20 Five categories of weapons were classified as
causing unnecessary suffering or being indiscriminate in their ef-
fects: 1) small-calibre projectiles; 2) blast and fragmentation
weapons; 3) time-delay weapons (land mines and booby traps); 4)
incendiary weapons; and 5) potential weapons development. 2 1 It
will be found that these experts chose well and that the weapons
in these five categories continued to constitute the subject of dis-
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1, at 373 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 401 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3317, 75
U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 423 [hereinafter Third
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, reprinted in Schindler & Toman,
supra note 1, at 495 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
18 See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
19 International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts
on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applica-
ble in Armed Conflicts: 2 Report on the Work of the Conference, Annexes 115, 116
(July 1972).
20 International Committee of the Red Cross, Weapons that may Cause Unneces-
sary Suffering or have Indiscriminate Effects: Report on the Work of Experts, paras.
11 and 12 (1973). It must be borne in mind that, despite the occasional efforts of a few
individuals, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons were never considered to be ar-
eas open for discussion in any of the conferences to which this Article refers.
21 Id. at chs. III-VII.
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cussions in the various subsequent conferences on this matter, up
to and including the conference that drafted the Conventional
Weapons Convention and Protocols which were the ultimate re-
sult of these labors.22
The Diplomatic Conference that met in Geneva for the first
time on February 20, 1974 (and did not complete its work until
June 10, 1977), established an Ad Hoc Committee on Conven-
tional Weapons, whose terms of reference called for it to "discuss
weapons without making any substantive or drafting decisions."2"
This Committee functioned throughout the four sessions of the
Diplomatic Conference.24 While the Ad Hoc Committee made no
substantive recommendations, during the final Plenary Meetings
the Diplomatic Conference adopted a resolution recommending
that a conference be held not later than 1979 to reach "agreements
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific weapons."2 5
22 "Small-calibre projectiles" was the only weapons category to fall by the way-
side. A working paper on the subject (A/CONF.95/CW/5) was submitted at the Con-
ventional Weapons Conference by Sweden. This was followed by a "Summary of the
technical consultations in the Informal Working Group on Small-calibre Weapons
Systems" (A/CONF.95/CW/8); then this subject disappeared except for a resolution
adopted near the end of the 1979 session of the Conventional Weapons Conference.
See 1979 Report of the Conference to the General Assembly, (A/CONF.95/8), Oct. 8,
1979, at 51 [hereinafter 1979 Conference Report]; and Final Report of the Conference
to the General Assembly, (A/CONF.95/15), and Corr. 1-5, Oct. 27, 1980, at 10 [herein-
after 1980 Final Report]. It is understood that actual field tests conducted by the ex-
perts failed to substantiate the Swedish thesis that small-calibre weapons tumble and
tear more than larger calibre weapons, and therefore, cause more suffering than the
larger projectiles. Thus, further study was considered necessary before any action
could be recommended with respect to these weapons. Of course, the category "poten-
tial weapons development" constituted an academic discussion of weapons not yet in
the arsenal of any nation. Perhaps the weapons which fall within the ambit of the
1980 Protocol I to the Conventional Weapons Convention are in this category.
23 16 Official Records, supra note 13, at 5. It will be found that these limitations
on the activities of the Ad Hoc Committee were eventually disregarded. See id. at
551-627.
24 Concurrently, the ICRC sponsored two Conferences on the subject. See Report
of the Conference of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weap-
ons, Lucerne, 1974 (1974) [hereinafter Lucerne Conference]; Report of the Conference
of Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Lugano, 1975
(1976).
25 Resolution 22(M), Follow-up Regarding Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons, 1 Official Records, supra note 13, at Part One, 215-
216 and Part Two, 52-53. Committee I of the Diplomatic Conference had adopted a
provision on the subject for inclusion in the 1977 Additional Protocol I, CDDH/I/SR.
77, 9 Official Records, supra note 13, at 481-88, but that provision had been rejected
by the Plenary Meeting, 7 Official Records, supra note 13, at 33.
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The General Assembly of the United Nations took note of that
resolution and adopted its own resolution, convening in 1979 a
United Nations conference on prohibitions or restrictions on the
use of specific conventional weapons.26 Preparatory conferences
met in 1978 and 1979, and the Conventional Weapons Conference
met for the first time in Geneva from September 10, 1979, to Sep-
tember 28, 1979. The Conference met again from September 15,
1980, to October 10, 1980. At this latter session it completed the
drafting of a Conventional Weapons Convention and three Proto-
cols annexed to that Convention. This Article will focus on the
meaning and intent of the Conventional Weapons Convention and
its Protocols in order to determine whether there are valid reasons
that the United States and other major military nations to ratify
such instruments which advance the humanitarian law of war-
instruments that, moreover, such nations played a major role in
drafting.
I. Tim CONvENTIONAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
The Conventional Weapons Convention itself may truly be
termed an "umbrella" convention. It contains no substantive hu-
manitarian provisions, those being the subject matter of the three
Protocols which are annexed to it. It has several provisions, how-
ever, that are either controversial or unusual.
Article 1 makes the Conventional Weapons Convention and
its annexed Protocols applicable in accordance with the provisions
of Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 2 This is certainly
not a controversial provision, although it would have been prefer-
able to restate the article itself in full, a practice followed else-
where in the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Proto-
cols.2 19 It then proceeds to make them applicable in "any situation
described in paragraph 4 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol I to
26 GA. Res. 32/152, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 57, U.N. Doe. A/32/45
(1977), reprinted in [1977] 31 Y.U.N. 43, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.1, and in 16 UNrrED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONs 529 (Dusan J. Djonovich, ed. 1984) [hereinafter Djonovich].
For some reason, despite the more specific title that the General Assembly gave to its
agenda item, the resolution bears the title "Incendiary and other specific conventional
weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanita-
rian reasons."
27 See generally 1980 Final Act, supra note 1.
28 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, art. 2.
29 For example, Article 7(1) of the Conventional Weapons Convention is a restate-
ment of the first sentence of Article 96(2) of the 1977 Protocol I.
648 [Vol. 68:643
PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
these Conventions."30 This provision of the 1977 Additional Proto-
col I, making an international law-of-war convention applicable in
conflicts involving national liberation movements (theretofore con-
sidered to be internal in nature), is one of the major reasons why
the United States has not ratified this latter instrument.
Although the present author agrees with the objection of the
United States to this provision in the 1977 Additional Protocol I,
primarily because it was the basis for Article 44(3) of that Protocol
which removed the historic requirements for legal combatants
from members of national liberation movements, the latter provi-
sion has no effect on the Conventional Weapons Convention or its
Protocols. There is no question here of hiding one's personal
weapons from view, concealing oneself among civilians prepara-
tory to an attack, or wearing no visible distinguishing insignia.
Anyone whose State or "authority" has agreed to be bound by any
of these Protocols who thereafter violates the humanitarian provi-
sions thereof will be guilty of a war crime, whether he be a uni-
formed soldier in an international or civil war, a rebel in a civil
war, or a member of a national liberation movement in hostilities
against the colonial power.3 ' While ratifying the Conventional
Weapons Convention, the United States could easily express its
30 Article 1(4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, states that "[t~he
situations referred to in the preceding paragraph include armed conflicts in which
people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against ra-
cist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination. .. " Once again, it
would have been preferable to include the entire provision-but any attempt to do
this would probably have increased the non-palatability of the provision tenfold!
31 It is possible that the claim will be made, as it has sometimes been made with
respect to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 17, that if
the State involved in a civil war, or a war of national liberation, is a Party to the
Conventional Weapons Convention and some or all of its Protocols, the provisions of
those instruments are automatically binding upon its adversary, whether or not an
"authority" has taken any action with respect thereto. This is based on the theory
that all of the nationals of a State Party to an international agreement are bound by
the provisions thereof. On the other hand, rebels have generally denied that they are
bound by the acts of a government that they are seeking to overthrow.
1994]
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displeasure with this provision by way of an understanding32 or,
as France has done, by making a specific reservation.33
Article 2 is concerned with the relation of the Conventional
Weapons Convention and its Protocols to other international
agreements, affirming that they do not detract "from other obliga-
tions imposed upon the High Contracting Parties by international
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict." This provision
appears to be superfluous inasmuch as there is nothing in these
instruments which could possibly have that effect. If anything,
they "add to," they do not "detract from" other obligations. 4
Article 3 (Signature) is a part of the standard boilerplate of
international agreements, as are Articles 5 (Entry into force), 6
(Dissemination), 9 (Denunciation), 10 (Depositary), and 11 (Au-
thentic texts).35 Naturally, some of these articles contain varia-
tions from the standard to meet the particular circumstances of
the Conventional Weapons Convention.
32 See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. 4568 (1995) (declaring
that "the United States will apply the provisions of the Convention, Protocol I, and
Protocol II to all armed conflicts referred to in Articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 1949"). The United
States may contend, as it does with respect to the provision in the 1977 Additional
Protocol I, that this provision will protect terrorists. Such a contention has no validity
with respect to the 1977 Additional Protocol I-and it has even less validity here.
33 The French reservation (made upon signature) states, "With reference to the
scope of application defined in article 1 of the [Conventional Weapons Convention],
that it will apply the provisions of that Convention and its three Protocols to all the
armed conflicts referred to in articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949." MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED wITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
833, 834 (1991), 20 I.L.M. 1287 (1981) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (noting
reservations, declarations, and statements of signatory nations), reprinted in Schin-
dler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193-94. No Party to the Conventional Weapons Con-
vention is known to have taken exception to the French reservation, though it ex-
cludes the reference to the 1977 Additional Protocol I and national liberation
movements.
34 Nevertheless, one commentator has found it necessary to allocate three pages
of discussion to this subject. Elmar Rauch, The Protection of the Civilian Population
in International Armed Conflicts and the Use of Landmines, 24 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L.
262, 264-66 (1981). The present author does concur with Rauch's finding that the
Conventional Weapons Convention is not a supplement to the 1977 Additional Proto-
col I. Id. at 265. Another commentator states that [tlhe purpose of this Article is to
exclude the a contraria line of argument whose adherents might claim that anything
not specifically prohibited in the Convention is allowed." A.P.V. Rogers, A Commen-
tary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps
and Other Devices, 26 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 185, 188 (1987).
35 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, arts. 3, 5, 6, 9-11.
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Article 4 (Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession) be-
gins in the standard fashion, but paragraph 3 requires discussion.
It provides:
Expressions of consent to be bound by any of the Protocols an-
nexed to this Convention shall be optional for each State, pro-
vided that at the time of the deposit of its instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, or approval of this Convention or of accession
thereto, that State shall notify the depositary of its consent to be
bound by any two or more of these Protocols.36
Apparently, the United States construes this provision as author-
izing reservations and understandings. At the time of signing, the
United States said:
In addition, the United States of course reserves the right, at the
time of ratification, to exercise the option provided by Article 4(3)
of the Convention, and to make statements of understanding
and/or reservations, to the extent that it may deem necessary to
ensure that the Convention and its Protocols conform to humani-
tarian and military requirements.3 7
Inasmuch as the Convention contains no prohibition against res-
ervations or understandings, it is somewhat difficult to under-
stand why the United States considered it necessary to announce
its construction of Article 4(3) as specifically granting that right. 8
Furthermore, paragraph 3 contains a rather unusual provi-
sion in that when a State becomes a Party to the Conventional
Weapons Convention "that State shall notify the depositary of its
consent to be bound by any two or more of these Protocols."39
There was thought to be good reason for this provision. As shall
be noted, the 1980 Protocol I, concerned with nondetectable frag-
ments, was completely noncontroversial, and it could be expected
that many States might ratify the Conventional Weapons Conven-
tion and Protocol I only. Article 4 compels States to give more
consideration to the other two Protocols, and thus, it prevents
States from ratifying only the Conventional Weapons Convention
36 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A, art. 4.
37 MULTILATERAL TREATiEs, supra note 33, at 832, 835, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 192, 196.
38 Perhaps the United States was making two separate statements: one setting
forth its intent to exercise the option of not ratifying all three protocols, and another
reserving the right to make statements of understandings and/or reservations. In-
deed, if this were so, the U.S. could have made its intent much clearer-e.g., by the
use of a semi-colon instead of a comma after the words "article 4(3) of the
Convention".
39 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. A art. 4 (emphasis added).
1994]
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and Protocol I and thereafter claiming the status of Parties to the
Convention.4 °
In addition to a provision rejecting the general participation
(si omnes) doctrine contained in Article 7( 1),4 Article 7 contains a
number of other provisions with respect to treaty relations be-
tween the Parties. Unfortunately, not content with the provision
addressing national liberation movements (termed an "authority")
contained in Article 1, the Conference found it necessary to in-
clude further lengthy special provisions on this subject in Article
7(4), in an attempt to link the Conventional Weapons Convention
with the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional
Protocol 1.42 The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Addi-
tional Protocol I are completely irrelevant to the Conventional
Weapons Convention and its Protocols.43 Those instruments do
not contain prohibitions or restrictions on the use of specific con-
40 The United States had suggested mandatory acceptance of all three Protocols.
1980 Report of the United States Delegation to the Conference on Prohibitions or Re-
strictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects 13 [hereinafter 1980 Report of
the United States Delegation]. The actions of States in ratifying or acceding to the
1980 Conventional Weapons Convention would seem to indicate that the fear which
engendered this provision was unwarranted. As of January 1, 1992, thirty-one States
had ratified or acceded to the Convention. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at
832-33. Every State had also ratified or acceded to all three Protocols, with the excep-
tion of Bonin, which did not approve 1980 Protocol II, and France, which did not ratify
1980 Protocol I. Id.
41 This provision, contained in Article 7, is similar to the provisions of Common
Article 2(3) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. See supra note 17. It continues the prac-
tice of reversing the procedure contained in the 1907 Hague Conventions which were
not effective if any single belligerent was not a Party to a particular Convention-a
provision erroneously applied by Justice Pal in his dissent in the trial before the In-
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East. See HowARD S. LEvIE, TERRORISM IN
WAR: THE LAw of WAR CRImEs 152 (1993).
42 The provisions adopted were actually mild compared to those sought by the
African group of nations. Interestingly, the United States did not object to these pro-
visions at the Conventional Weapons Conference. Instead, the United States insisted
that the Convention only apply to internal conflicts if the "authority" of the liberation
movement "had accepted and applied the rules of warfare which already apply to
States as a result of various international agreements." 1980 Report of The United
States Delegation, supra note 40, at 14. This meant that an "authority" could not
"take advantage of the Convention unless it had accepted and applied certain rules of
warfare concerning, among other things, the treatment of prisoners and the protec-
tion of noncombatants." Id.
43 It is suggested that it would have been more appropriate merely to make the
Conventional Weapons Convention and the Protocols, which were previously ap-
proved by the State involved in the conflict, applicable when the "authority" had
agreed to accept and apply them.
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ventional weapons. 44 Clearly, these special provisions were an-
other attempt to secure for national liberation movements the
benefits of all of the humanitarian law of war upon an undertak-
ing by an "authority" that is rarely able to control the activities of
the members of its movement and that uses the civilian popula-
tion as a military objective rather than as something to be pro-
tected. France, like the United States, is not a Party to the 1977
Additional Protocol I and had no difficulty in making a reservation
to Article 7(4)(b) of the 1980 Convention.4 5 There is no reason
why the United States should not make a similar reservation, if it
is so minded.46 Moreover, it is of interest that, while Common Ar-
ticle 3(4) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (with respect to armed
conflicts not of an international character) and Article 4 of the
1977 Additional Protocol I both provide that the application of
those instruments does not affect the legal status of the Parties,
no such provision was included in the Conventional Weapons
Convention.47
44 The Assistant Director of the ICRC's Department of Principles of Law, Yves
Sandoz, has stated that the Conventional Weapons Convention and its Protocols "are
valuable, or rather indispensable, supplements to the 1977 Protocols." Yves Sandoz,
A New Step Forward in International Law: Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons, 21 IN'L REv. R I CROSS 3, 16 (Jan.-Feb. 1981). Ab-
sent in the Conventional Weapons Convention is a provision similar to Article 1(3) of
the 1977 Additional Protocol I, specifically stating that it supplements the 1949 Ge-
neva Conventions. While the Convention and its Protocols supplement the 1977 Ad-
ditional Protocol I in the sense that they contain law-of-war provisions not contained
in that Protocol, they are completely independent and have no other relationship
thereto. States can be Parties to the Conventional Weapons Convention and some or
all of its Protocols without being Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I. States
cannot be Parties to the 1977 Additional Protocol I without being Parties to the 1949
Geneva Conventions. See 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 92.
45 Upon signing the Conventional Weapons Convention, France made a reserva-
tion stating:
[A]s regards the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, the declaration of
acceptance and application provided for in article 7, paragraph 4(b), of the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions... will have no effects other than
those provided for in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in so far
as that article is applicable.
M UILATERAL TREATIEs, supra note 33, at 833-34, 20 I.L.M. at 1287 (1981), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193-94. Once again, no Party is known to
have taken exception to France's reservation. Article 3 common to the Geneva Con-
ventions sets forth rules applicable in wars "not of an international character"-i.e.
civil wars.
46 Indeed, the Senate made such a reservation when it ratified the Convention. S.
Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REO. 4568 (1995).
47 Upon signing the Convention, France made an interpretive statement that the
application of the Convention would have no effect on the legal status of the parties to
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Notably, one subject that is missing from the Conventional
Weapons Convention that is probably more important in a hu-
manitarian law-of-war treaty than in most types of treaties (other
than a disarmament treaty) is the question of verification. Efforts
to include such a provision were strongly and successfully
resisted.48
II. 1980 PROTOCOL I
The 1980 Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments ("Protocol
I")4 1 is a single sentence which provides that "[i]t is prohibited to
use any weapon the primary effects of which is to injure by frag-
ments which in the human body escape detection by X-rays."50
This Protocol was directed primarily against weapons made of
such materials as glass and plastic. The United States had be-
come a cosponsor of the proposal for this Protocol, which was
adopted unanimously.51 One of the U.S. Delegates attributed the
unanimity "in part to the fact that no one seems to have had any
serious military interest in such a weapon."52 Accordingly, the
United States is justified in ratifying this Protocol.
the conflict. MULTILATERAL TREATIEs, supra note 33, at 833, 20 I.L.M. at 1287 (1981),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 193.
48 France, Italy, the United States, and the People's Republic of China made
statements deprecating this omission upon signing the Conventional Weapons Con-
vention. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at 833-35, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 192-96.
49 Protocol I Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Inju-
rious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. B, 19 I.L.M.
1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185 [hereinafter
"Protocol "].
50 Id.
51 1979 Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference
on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May
be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects 5 [hereinafter
1979 Report of the United States Delegation]. The 1980 Report of the United States
Delegation, supra note 40, at 5, states: 'The proposal does not, however, preclude non-
metallic casing materials or other parts or components which are not designed as the
primary wounding mechanism."
52 Matheson, Remarks, 1979 Pnoc. A.S.I.L. 156, 157. See also W.J. Fenrick, The
Law of Armed Conflict: The CUSHIE Weapons Treaty, 11 CAN. DEF.Q. 25 (Summer
1981). The then Major Fenrick states flatly that this Protocol "bans a weapon which
does not exist." Id. at 27. He also explains that "CUSHIE is an unofficial Canadian
acronym derived from the words 'Causing Unnecessary Suffering or Having Indis-
criminate Effects.'" Id. at 30 n.2.
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III. 1980 PROTOCOL II
The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use
of Mines, Booby Traps and Other Devices ("Protocol II")5 3 is con-
cerned with the "time-delay" weapons referred to by the 1973 Con-
ference of Government Experts.54 Such weapons include: 1) anti-
vehicle and antipersonnel land mines, hand-buried or delivered by
aircraft, artillery, or naval guns;55 2) booby traps; and 3) other de-
vices. While the 1980 Protocol II was more controversial than
Protocol I, it was without question of greater importance.
Article 1 of the 1980 Protocol II, entitled Material Scope of
Application, makes clear that its subject matter is limited to the
use of the aforementioned weapons on land only ("including mines
laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings or river crossings")
and that it "does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or
in inland waterways." 56 Although there appears to have been lit-
tle c6ntroversy involved in the drafting of this article, its impor-
tance cannot be overestimated.57
53 Protocol 11 Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Inju-
rious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M.
1523, 1529 (1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 177, 185 [herein-
after "Protocol Ir].
54 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The 1956 Draft Rules are the source
of many of the provisions of both Protocol I and Protocol I. Draft Rules for the
Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War (2d Ed.
1958) reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 251.
55 It is important to note that while land mines are primarily a defensive mecha-
nism intended to impede enemy movement, the infliction of casualties being an inci-
dental result, such mines are now also used offensively. Burrus M. Carnahan, The
Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, 22 MIL. L. & L. WAR REv. 117, 120-22 (1983) (citing Lucerne
Conference, supra note 24, at 229).
56 Protocol II, 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, 19 I.L.M. at 1529, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185. It is unfortunate, that advantage was not
taken of the opportunity to draft international legislation restricting the use of sea
mines, particularly on the high seas, restrictions which are long overdue. See How-
ARD S. LEviE, MiNE WARFARE AT SEA 52-53 (1992).
57 Despite the fact that Article 49(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note
13, specifically states that the provisions of that Section apply "to all attacks from the
sea ... against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict at sea," (emphasis added), one author has found that
the provisions of the Section "apply to all acts of naval warfare which may affect the
civilian population." RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVEN-
TIONS: REPERCUSSIONS ON THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 57-60 (1984). The quoted pro-
visions should preclude any such contention with respect to the 1980 Protocol II.
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Article 2, entitled Definitions, defines "mine," "booby-traps,"
and "other devices." It provides:
1. "Mine" means any munition placed under, on or near the
ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or ex-
ploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehi-
cle,58 and "remotely delivered mine" means any mine ... deliv-
ered by artillery, rocket, mortar or similar means or dropped
from an aircraft. 59
2. "Booby-trap" means any device or material which is
designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure and which func-
tions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or approaches an ap-
parently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act.60
3. "Other device" means manually-emplaced munitions and de-
vices designed to kill, injure or damage and which are actuated
by remote control or automatically after a lapse of time.61
Inasmuch as this definition of "other devices" contains no ex-
amples and, unlike the procedure followed with respect to the
other weapons covered by this Protocol, no additional article deals
exclusively with "other devices," it is likely that there will be con-
troversy regarding exactly which weapons were the intended tar-
get of this provision.
Article 2(4), defining "military objective," appears to have en-
gendered no controversy. It reads:
"Military objective" means, so far as objects are concerned, any
object which by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an ef-
fective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances rul-
ing at the time, offers a definite military advantage. 62
58 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & To-
man, supra note 1, at 180.
59 Id. One commentator hazards the opinion that in the future most land mines
will be laid by aircraft, rockets, or artillery. Carnahan, supra note 55, at 123.
60 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & To-
man, supra note 1, at 180.
61 Id. This provision appears to consider as being inhumane manually-emplaced
"other devices" which include exactly the mechanisms which are required in remotely-
delivered mines. See supra text accompanying note 59. The logic of the distinction is
difficult to understand.
62 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1530, reprinted in Schindler & To-
man, supra note 1, at 185. This provision obviously had as its basic source paragraph
2 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1969, entitled The
Distinction Between Military Objectives and Non-Military Objects In General and Par-
ticularly the Problems Associated With Weapons of Mass Destruction, 66 AM.J.ThsL L.
470, 470-71 (1972), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 265. Its immedi-
ate source was Article 52(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13.
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Article 2(5) was essentially unnecessary, as its content follows
from Article 2(4). It defines "civilian objects" as "all objects which
are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 4."63
Finally, Article 2(6) defines "recording" as "a physical, admin-
istrative and technical operation designed to obtain, for the pur-
pose of registration in the official records, all available informa-
tion facilitating the location of minefields, mines and booby-traps."
Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the 1980 Protocol II set forth general
restrictions on the use of all of the weapons covered by the Proto-
col: mines, booby-traps, and other devices. The main objective of
their provisions is to protect both the civilian population and indi-
vidual civilians from the effects of these weapons.6 4 There ap-
pears to be very little in their provisions that could be considered
controversial. The provision of Article 4 requiring "the posting of
warning signs" and "the issue of warnings" of the location of mine
fields, however, is somewhat unrealistic.6 5 To a large degree, the
value of mines is that the progress of an attacking force is slowed
up by the need to search for, locate, and neutralize minefields and
individual mines. This advantage is lost if the minelayer is
obliged to make public to all, which necessarily includes the en-
emy, the location of mines that have been laid.66 Moreover, the
provisions of Article 5 presume an accuracy for remotely-delivered
mines which may be incorrect. While the requirement for a self-
actuating or remotely-controlled mechanism which renders a mine
harmless (mechanisms which have long been employed on sea
mines) would, in general, be a protection for the civilian popula-
tion, one might wonder whether the safety of civilians is jeopard-
ized when that mechanism is one which causes the mine to de-
stroy itself by exploding without warning. 7
63 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 52(1).
64 See Rogers, supra note 34, at 187. One commentator, a member of the United
Kingdom Delegation at the Conventional Weapons Conference states: "The Confer-
ence was concerned, therefore, with finding ways of protecting the innocent from the
dangers of mines and booby traps while at the same time preserving this important
means of self-defence." Id.
65 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, 19 I.L.M. at 1531 (1980), reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 186.
66 Rogers, supra note 34, at 193 (labeling provision as "merely hortatory").
67 These various mechanisms are frequently used when the armed force which
delivers the mines from a remote source anticipates that its troops will need to trav-
erse the mined area in the near future.
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Article 6 of the 1980 Protocol II, establishing prohibitions on
the use of booby-traps, 68 is a very important provision for the pro-
tection of civilians, particularly children. It provides:
1. Without prejudice to the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict relating to treachery and perfidy, it is prohib-
ited in all circumstances to use:
(a) any booby-trap in the form of an apparently harmless
portable object which is specifically designed and constructed
to contain explosive material and to detonate when it is dis-
turbed or approached,69 or
(b) booby-traps which are in any way attached to or associ-
ated with: (i) internationally recognized protective emblems,
signs or signals; (ii) sick, wounded or dead persons; (iii) bur-
ial or cremation sites or graves; (iv) medical facilities, medi-
cal equipment, medical supplies or medical transportation;
(v) children's toys or other portable objects or products specif-
ically designed for the feeding, health, hygiene, clothing or
education of children;7 ° (vi) food or drink; (vii) kitchen uten-
sils or appliances except in military establishments, military
locations or military supply depots; (viii) objects clearly of a
religious nature; (ix) historic monuments, works of art or
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual
heritage of peoples; (x) animals or their carcasses.
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to use any booby-trap
which is designed to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering.
7 1
Introducing Article 6(1) with the phrase 'Without prejudice to
the rules of international law ... relating to treachery and per-
fidy" was an unfortunate decision. 72 Despicable as many booby-
68 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6(1)(b)(v), 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980),
reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 187.
69 See Rogers, supra note 34, at 199. With respect to this provision: 'There is no
reason why booby-traps should not be prefabricated so long as they are not in the
shape of a harmless, portable object. What the Conference had in mind to prohibit
were booby-traps made to look like watches, cameras, pens or other attractive items.
It did not prohibit the booby-trapping of existing attractive items." Id. In other words,
a belligerent may booby-trap a camera, but it may not manufacture booby-traps
which appear to be cameras.
70 The Working Group proposal referred solely to "children's toys." A/CONF.95/3,
Annex II, at 9; 1979 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 51, app. D.
The Committee of the Whole added the rest of item 1(b)(v), probably having in mind
events in Afghanistan where the booby-trapping of objects intended for children's care
caused countless children to be killed or maimed.
71 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 6, 19 I.L.M. at 1532 (1980), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 187.
72 Id.
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traps have been, they have not generally heretofore been consid-
ered to be either treacherous or perfidious. 73 Obviously, it was not
intended that this Protocol would declare all booby-traps treacher-
ous and perfidious. Had that been the intention, the lengthy
enumeration would have been unnecessary.74 Notwithstanding,
the quoted phrase will unquestionably be used, on occasion, as the
basis for an argument that any particular booby-trap is both
treacherous and perfidious and, therefore, a violation of the law of
war.
75
Article 7 of the 1980 Protocol II amplifies the definition of "re-
cording" contained in Article 2.76 It includes some of the provi-
sions which were exceedingly difficult to draft, primarily because
of the technical problems involved.77 In addition, there was
strong support for a provision requiring the exchange of full infor-
mation between belligerents concerning the location of minefields
immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. Nevertheless, para-
graph (3)(a)(i) of Article 7, requiring the belligerents "to take all
necessary and appropriate measures" to protect civilians immedi-
ately after the cessation of hostilities, 78 represents a compromise
reached because a number of nations were unwilling to require a
belligerent, some of whose territory might still be occupied at the
time of the cessation of hostilities, to make available to the occu-
pier the location of minefields which might become valuable in the
event that there was a resumption of hostilities. However, under
73 During World War HI the Germans were particularly adept at preparing booby-
traps; but no German was tried on the charge that such an act was treacherous or
perfidious and a violation of the law of war.
74 An example of a booby-trap that would be legal, even under the 1980 Protocol
H, is one made as part of a land mine which would cause the mine to explode if at-
tempts were made to move it or to deactivate it before its own internal mechanism
causes it to deactivate or self-destruct. These would not fall within the definition of
"other devices." 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 3(1)(C), 19 LL.M. at 1530
(1980), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 185. The Germans used such
booby-traps in their sea mines and in various types of aerial bombs dropped on Great
Britain during World War H, and no charge was ever made that such action had been
treacherous or perfidious.
75 Article 37 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states "[a]cts inviting the confi-
dence of an adversary ... shall constitute perfidy." 1977 Additional Protocol I, supra
note 13, art. 37, 16 I.L.M. at 1409 (1977), reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note
1. The rare cases in which a booby-trap might be used in connection with such an
invitation are certainly covered in Article 6(1) of Protocol 11.
76 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 7, 19 I.L.M. at 1532-33 (1980), re-
printed in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 187-88.
77 1980 Report of The United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 6-7.
78 Id.
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sub-paragraphs (3)(a)(ii) and (iii) of that article, where there is no
occupied territory, or where troops occupying enemy territory
have withdrawn therefrom, there is no discretion involved-
records of minefields and booby-trapped areas must be made
available to the other Party and to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.79 It is appropriate to point out here that, based
on a proposal made by Morocco, there is a Technical Annex to Pro-
tocol II containing guidelines on recording which are to be "taken
into account."8 0 With regard to the Technical Annex the United
States has said:
(1) its provisions are not mandatory or uniformly applicable in all
circumstances, but only "guidelines" which are to be "taken into
account"; (2) the items of information listed in the Annex are of a
sufficiently general character so as to be operationally practica-
ble and to provide sufficient flexibility; (3) the Annex relates
solely to information needed to establish the location of
minefields and does not require disclosure of technical character-
istics of the mines used; and (4) the addition of the Annex pro-
vides the assurance that the recording obligations of the Protocol
would in any event be satisfied if the items of information listed
in the Annex are recorded.8 '
In view of the many, many casualties caused by mines after
the cessation of hostilities, particularly among civilians, there
should be no relaxation of the rules governing the maintenance of
complete records with respect to mines laid during the course of
hostilities and the availability of those records to all concerned at
the earliest possible date.8"
Article 8 of Protocol II deals with the protection of United Na-
tions forces and missions from the minefields, mines, and areas of
79 Id. During the 1982 conflict in the Falklands (Malvinas) the Argentines sowed
plastic mines indiscriminately and without recording their locations. This resulted in
many casualties occurring after the cessation of hostilities. V. AnAmS, THE FALK-
LANDS CONFLIcT 50 (1988).
80 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at 22-23. Morocco was plagued with
explosions of World War II mines and booby-traps for many years after the termina-
tion of that conflict, as were other North African countries. Cf G.A. Res. 35/71, U.N.
GAOR 2d Comm., 35th Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/35/592!Add.4 (1980), re-
printed in 19 Djonovich, supra note 26, at 311 (recognizing that most developing coun-
tries exposed to wars waged by colonial powers suffer loss of life and property as a
result of mines).
81 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 7-8.
82 See, e.g., Cauderay, Anti-Personnel Mines, 33 rINTL REv. RED CROSS 273 (July-
August 1993). See also ARMs PROJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTs WATCH, LANDMINES: A
DEADLY LEGACY, passim (1993).
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booby-traps established by the belligerent parties prior to the arri-
val of a United Nations peacekeeping, observation, or other simi-
lar mission.83 Its provisions appear to be completely reasonable
and noncontroversial. When United Nations peacekeeping or ob-
servation forces are involved, extensive protection from minefields
and booby-traps (removal, other measures, and providing the nec-
essary information) is required; when a United Nations mission is
involved, the belligerent party must provide it with protection
from those weapons.84
Finally, Article 9 deals with the very important subject of in-
ternational cooperation in the removal of minefields, mines, and
booby-traps.8 5 At the end of World War II an international organ-
ization was established for the removal of sea mines,86 but the
failure to take any concerted international action with respect to
land mines and booby-traps resulted in accidental deaths and in-
juries to innocent civilians for many years thereafter.8 7
83 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 8, 19 I.L.M. at 1533 (1980), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 188.
84 See L.C. GREEN, THE CoNTEMPoRARY LAW OF ARMoED CoN'LioT 133 (1993). Fol-
lowing the Gulf War, military personnel, under the auspices of the Security Council
resolutions, sustained severe casualties during cleaning operations as Iraq failed to
keep proper records of the locations of minefields. Id. Negligence in keeping such
records also resulted in numerous injuries to civilians after the cessation of hostilities
in Cambodia and the Falklands. Id.
85 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. C, art. 9, 19 I.L.M. at 1534 (1980), reprinted
in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 188.
86 International Agreement for the Clearance of Mines in European Waters, Nov.
22, 1945, reprinted in 3 Bevans, supra note 9, at 1322. Following World War II, Ger-
man prisoners of war were used to remove land mines laid by the Germans in France.
This resulted in a number of casualties. Because of that experience, Article 52(1) of
the 1949 Third Geneva Convention provides that prisoners of war may not be com-
pelled to undertake dangerous labor and specifically states that the removal of mines
falls within this category. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 17, at art.
52(1)(3). During the Falklands (Malvinas) War it was alleged that the British were
violating this provision. Howard S. Levie, The Falklands Crisis and the Laws of War,
in THE FAucrK'Ds WAR: LEssONS FOR STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
64, 73 (Alberto R. Coll & Anthony C. Arend, eds., 1985). Investigation revealed that
Argentine prisoners of war had volunteered to mark a stock of Argentine mines which
had been stored at a location close to their prisoner-of-war camp.
87 Carnahan, supra note 55, at 126, cites three post-World War 11 treaties con-
taining provisions with respect to the removal of land mines: Agreement Between the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the One Hand, and the Supreme
Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers, on the Other Hand, Concerning a Military Armistice in Korea,
Panmunjom, Korea, July 27, 1953, art. 1I(13)(a), 4 U.S.T. 235, T.I.A.S. No. 2782, re-
printed in 4 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 2657 (Fred L. Israel, ed.,
1967-1980) [hereinafter Israel] (calling for removal of all minefields by commander of
side whose forces emplaced them); Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
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To summarize, while the 1980 Protocol II is not a perfectly
drafted international agreement, there is nothing objectionable in
its contents that, if deemed necessary, cannot be taken care of
with simple statements of understanding.88 There does not ap-
pear to be any reason why the United States should not accept
it. 8 9
IV. 1980 PROTOCOL III
The 1980 Protocol on Prohibitions and Restrictions on the Use
of Incendiary Weapons ("Protocol IIIO)9° is unquestionably the
most controversial of the three Protocols. The early opposition of
the United States to prohibitions or restrictions on the battlefield
use of incendiary weapons was used by the Soviet delegation "to
foster the impression in most quarters that this was the basic ob-
stacle to a successful conclusion of the Conference."91 Undoubt-
edly, it is the implications of this Protocol, rather than its content,
that make the United States reluctant to ratify the Conventional
Weapons Convention.92 Despite the fact that Protocol III contains
Peace in Viet-Nam: Protocol Concerning the Cease-fire in South Viet-Nam and the
Joint Military Commission, Paris, Jan. 27, 1973, art. 5, 24U.S.T. 38, pt.l., 39; T.I.A.S.
No. 7542, reprinted in 5 Israel 92, 93 (requiring each party to do its utmost to com-
plete removal or deactivation of all mine-fields and traps within fifteen days after
cease fire); Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of
Egypt and the State of Israel, Washington, March 26, 1979, art. VI(4), 18 LL.M. 362,
382-83, reprinted in 5 Israel 331,349 (agreeing that Israel will make efforts to destroy
or remove minefields in areas from which it withdraws).
88 See S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. 4568 (1995) (ratifying
Protocol II with understanding concerning Article 6(1)). But see Rauch, supra note 34,
at 286-287 (stating that provisions of 1977 Additional Protocol I and of 1980 Protocol
II relating to mines are incompatible). It is submitted that Rauch's conclusion is
based on an overly critical analysis. Nevertheless, this would not present a problem
to a country such as the United States which has not ratified, and apparently does not
intend to ratify, the 1977 Additional Protocol I.
89 See 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 8 ("The U.S.
Delegation supported the adoption of this Protocol in the belief that it would substan-
tially reduce collateral injury and damage to civilian populations, and would require
other armed forces to observe the kind of prudent and orderly practices in the employ-
ment of mines which U.S. forces already observe.").
90 Protocol I Annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Inju-
rious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Geneva, Oct. 10, 1980, 1980 Final Act, supra
note 1, app. D, 19 I.L.M. 1534, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 190
[hereinafter "Protocol III"].
91 1980 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 40, at 9.
92 Of course, the United States could do as France has already done: ratify the
Convention, but accept only Protocols I and II. However, this is certainly not a proce-
dure to be recommended.
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no prohibition or restriction on the use of napalm (other than the
general prohibitions and restrictions on the use of incendiary
weapons) or on the use of any incendiary weapons against combat-
ants,93 and despite the fact that the negotiating history is to the
contrary, it may be considered inevitable that, when the occasion
arises, the claim will be advanced that both of these are banned by
Protocol III.
Article I of Protocol III sets forth a series of definitions. It is
particularly notable that while the definition of incendiary weap-
ons includes the enumeration "flame throwers, fougasses, shells,
rockets, grenades, mines, bombs and other containers of incendi-
ary substances," it also enumerates what are not such weapons:
"illuminants, tracers, smoke or signalling systems... munitions
designed to combine penetration, blast or fragmentation effects
with an additional incendiary effect.., and similar combined ef-
fects munitions."9 4
Protocol III has only one other article. Drafting it was proba-
bly one of the most difficult tasks that the Conference and its or-
gans encountered. 95 One major issue had been resolved by exclud-
ing combined-effects munitions ("CEMs") from the ambit of the
term "incendiary weapons."96 Although the word "napalm" was
heard again and again during the discussions conducted with re-
spect to this Protocol and was included in a number of proposals,97
nowhere in Protocol III will one find that word used. This issue
was resolved by eliminating all mention of napalm, thus permit-
ting its use against combatants but not against civilians or civil-
ian objects, which are protected against all incendiary attacks.9"
93 See Sandoz, supra note 44, at 13 (supporting notion that emphasis was placed
on danger that incendiary weapons present to civilians).
94 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, art. 1., 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 190.
95 It is interesting to note that the Draft Protocol prepared by the 1979 Confer-
ence Working Group on Incendiary Weapons included an alternative proposal which
read simply: "It is prohibited to use incendiary weapons." 1979 Conference Report,
supra note 22, at 29.
96 See 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in Schin-
dler & Toman, supra note 1, at 190.
97 See, e.g., Working Group's Draft Protocol, 1979 Conference Report, supra note
22, at 28; see also the proposal by Australia and the Netherlands, supra note 22, at 33.
98 1980 Final Act, supra note 1, app. D, art. 2, 19 I.L.M. at 1534, reprinted in
Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 190. It has also been strongly urged that the use
of incendiaries against combatants be prohibited. See, e.g., the proposals by the So-
viet Union, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Jordan, 1979 Conference Report, supra note 22, at
31.
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Article 2 is of such importance that it warrants complete
quotation:
1. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make the civilian pop-
ulation as such, individual civilians or civilian objects the object
of attack by incendiary weapons. 99
2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to make any military ob-
jective located within a concentration of civilians the object of at-
tack by air-delivered incendiary weapons.
3. It is further prohibited to make any military objective located
within a concentration of civilians the object of attack by means
of incendiary weapons other than air-delivered incendiary weap-
ons, except when such military objective is clearly separated
from the concentration of civilians and all feasible precautions
are taken with a view to limiting the incendiary effects to the
military objective and to avoiding, and in any event to minimiz-
ing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage
to civilian objects.
4. It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover
the object of attack by incendiary weapons except when such nat-
ural elements are used to cover, conceal or camouflage combat-
ants or other military objectives, or are themselves military
objectives. 00
The prohibition contained in the second paragraph perhaps
encompasses too much. It encourages the establishment of mili-
tary objectives which are valid military targets within cities,
towns, and villages, (all concentrations of civilians) thus immuniz-
ing the military objective from attack by air-delivered incendiary
weapons, perhaps the only appropriate means of attack.10 1 The
drafters would have been better advised to use the provisions of
Article 57(2)(a) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I as the basis for
the provisions of this paragraph.10 2 However, this is a problem
99 This will mean that there will be no more fire-bombing of cities such as Tokyo,
Dresden, etc., in some of which more civilian lives were lost than at Hiroshima or
Nagasaki.
100 Beginning with the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques, Geneva, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 167
I.L.M. 88, reprinted in Schindler & Toman, supra note 1, at 163; continuing with the
1977 Additional Protocol I, supra note 13, at arts. 35(3) and 55; and now with the
Protocol I, supra note 90, the draftsmen of law-of-war conventions have taken a few
small steps towards the protection of the natural environment from the havoc of war.
101 During the Vietnamese conflict, when the North Vietnamese became aware of
the fact that a large area around Hanoi was "off-limits" for attacks by American air-
craft, that area became the major collection area for military supplies.
102 That provision of the 1977 Additional Protocol I sets forth the precautions
which must be taken when a military objective is to be attacked and includes the
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which could be readily corrected by a reservation, or even by an
understanding.
The insertion of the phrase "other than air-delivered incendi-
ary weapons" in paragraph 3 of this article was unnecessary and
renders the provision ambiguous. It was probably meant to indi-
cate that this paragraph was intended to cover all the possibilities
not covered by paragraph 2 of the same article. However, this
phrase could validly be construed to mean that under the stated
circumstances (a military objective within a concentration of civil-
ians) attacks by all types of incendiary weapons, except by ("other
than" by) air-delivered incendiary weapons are prohibited-even
though (or perhaps because) that procedure had been specifically
prohibited by the previous paragraph. Was it intended thereby to
exempt from the prohibition contained in the previous paragraph
air-delivered incendiaries under the circumstances set forth in the
"except" clause? Or was it intended thereby to exclude air-deliv-
ered incendiaries from the "except" clause itself? These are but a
few of the interpretations to which that phrase lends itself. Any
acceptance of Protocol III should include an understanding that
clearly sets forth what the use of that phrase is believed to have
been intended to accomplish.
To summarize, as far as it goes, the 1980 Protocol III is an
extremely humanitarian agreement which contains nothing irrep-
arable of either a political or a military nature that warrants the
refusal of the United States and other major military powers to
accept it.
EpILOGUE
When the United States signed the 1980 Conventional Weap-
ons Convention in 1982 it stated:
The United States Government welcomes the adoption of this
Convention, and hopes that all States will give the most serious
consideration to ratification or accession. We believe that the
Convention represents a positive step forward in efforts to mini-
mize injury or damage to the civilian population in time of armed
conflict. Our signature of this Convention reflects the general
willingness of the United States to adopt practical and reason-
taking of all feasible precautions to minimize civilian casualties. See 1977 Additional
Protocol, supra note 13, at art. 57(2).
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able provisions concerning the conduct of military operations, for
the purpose of protecting noncombatants. 1
0 3
More than a decade later, on March 21, 1994, the Secretary of
State transmitted that Convention and Protocols I and II to the
President with a recommendation for ratification by the United
States with the four following conditions:
1. The United States considers that the fourth paragraph of the
Preamble to the present Convention, which reproduces the sub-
ject of provisions of Article 35, Paragraph 3 and Article 55, Para-
graph 1 of Additional Protocol I [to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions], applies only to [s]tates which have accepted those
provisions;
2. The United States declares, with reference to the scope of ap-
plication defined in Article 1 of the present Convention, that it
will apply the provisions of the present Convention to all armed
conflicts referred to in Articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949;
3. The United States declares that Article 7, Paragraph 4(b) of
the present Convention will have no effect; and
4. The United States understands that Article 6, Paragraph
1(a) of Protocol II to the present Convention does not prohibit the
adaptation of other objects for use as booby-traps.' 04
The President transmitted the 1980 Conventional Weapons Con-
vention and its Protocols I and II to the Senate on May 12, 1994,
recommending that the Senate give its advice and consent to their
ratification subject to the above stated conditions. 0 5 He deferred
action on Protocol III pending further examination concerning its
acceptability from a military point of view.'0 6 On March 24, 1995,
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the
Convention, Protocol I, and Protocol 11.107.
103 MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 33, at 833, 835, reprinted in Schindler &
Toman, supra note 1, at 196.
104 S. TREATY Doc. No. 25, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) reprinted in 88 ArMi. J.
INT'L L. 748, 751 (1994).
105 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 749 (1994).
106 Id. at 748. "Further examination" when 14 years have elapsed since that Pro-
tocol was drafted!
107 S. Res. 4568, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. IEc. 4568 (1995).
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